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1. Introduction 
The banking sectors of the European Union have faced numerous challenges in the past decade. With 
regard to old EU members, as a result of the Second European Banking Directive and the Single 
European Passport the speed of deregulation accelerated, and with the elimination or lowering of 
barriers market-entry costs substantially decreased, favouring competition and the creation of a 
Unified Banking Market. Economic and monetary union also encouraged the abolition of operational 
obstacles. The introduction of the euro opened the way for the further deepening of banking sector 
integration, whereby local banks gradually lost their competitive edge to foreign banks, mainly in terms 
of financial services. The rapid development of information technology, the appearance of new 
competitors exploiting opportunities offered by a global capital market and the creation of new markets 
linked to rapid innovations also promoted the intensification of competition and the accelerated 
consolidation of the European banking system. 
Following the collapse of the centrally planned economic regime and the break-up of the mono-bank 
system in the new EU members, financial market liberalisation as well as economic privatisation laid 
the foundations of the modern financial institutional system. Considerable foreign capital inflow, market 
consolidation and the creation of an efficient regulatory framework contributed to the rapid 
transformation and development of the banking system and the market- based pricing and lending 
activity of banks. The integration of the banking system into the Single Banking Market commenced in 
parallel with the transformation of the financial intermediary system. Economic convergence, the 
harmonisation of regulations and the enlargement of the EU further accelerated the consolidation and 
integration of the banking systems of the new EU member states. 
Several factors can generate efficiency differences and change their measure across banking sectors 
of EU members. On the one hand, discrepancies in operational environment, i.e. country-specific 
elements and, on the other, different managerial abilities may cause an efficiency gap. National 
discrepancies in operational environment can derive from macroeconomic differences or dissimilar 
characteristics of financial infrastructure and institutional system, as well as from other country-specific 
factors. Managerial ability is defined in terms of adequate resource allocation and beneficial utilisation 
of technological opportunities. While operational environment exogenously explains efficiency 
differences, the executive and professional competence of management endogenously contributes to 
them. 
Our study focuses on the estimation of the efficiency gap between old and new EU members and the 
impact of exogenous (out of managerial control) and endogenous (under the control of management) 
factors upon it. For this purpose we attempt to separate these two types of effects by controlling for 
home bias. 
Two types of efficiency indicators are derived: so-called X-efficiency and alternative profit-efficiency. 
X-efficiency gives a measure of how managers are able to minimise cost and thus maximise profit by 
input allocation and exploration of technological opportunities alongside given output and input prices. 
Alternative profit-efficiency is measured by how managers are able to maximise profit if the output 
price is not given. We empirically confirm that the results produced from the measurement of cost- and 
profit-efficiency, as well as the conclusions, vary to a major degree depending on whether exogenous 
factors, i.e. operational characteristics, are controlled or not. 
                                            
1   The full paper is available on the webpage of Magyar Nemzeti Bank (www.mnb.hu). The authors assume sole responsibility 
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Our study underlines the importance of accounting for heterogeneity in operational environment. Due 
to profit-maximisation, only managerial ability in efficiency improvement is of particular relevance from 
the point of view of financial stability. Due to high profitability led by an insufficient level of competition 
or other market distortions, management may not pay enough attention to cost rationalisation or cost 
reduction, i.e. cost-efficiency improvement.
3 Yet this involves risk. Only “conscious” efficiency 
improvement can permanently contribute to banks’ income generating capability, since in the long 
term, as a consequence of the Unified European Banking Market, the efficiency differences caused by 
market distortions will probably disappear. The improvement of banking efficiency may have not only 
stability- but also welfare-related implications. Due to the “efficiency surplus” an efficiently operating 
banking sector can charge on average lower credit and higher deposit rates compared to a less 
efficient banking system. Owing to the important financing role of the banking sector in the economy, a 
narrowing net interest margin enhances investment activity and stimulates economic growth. 
Furthermore, it also contributes to an increase in consumer surplus, as lower credit rates entail a 
decreasing debt service burden and higher deposit rates trigger rising financial wealth. 
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 overviews the empirical literature on efficiency 
measurement; Section 3 describes the framework of our empirical investigation as well as the results; 
finally, Section 4 summarises and concludes. 
2. Overview  of  bank efficiency studies  
The roots of efficiency research originate from the institutional approach of corporate microeconomics. 
The measurement of efficiency was therefore initially performed in relation to the various industrial 
sectors of the real economy. In the past 15 to 20 years, the focus has shifted to the financial sector, 
with an emphasis on researching the efficiency of banks.  
The research into efficiency serves the purpose of estimating the so-called “efficient frontier” and 
analysing deviations from such frontier corresponding to the loss of efficiency. The methods are 
distinguished on the basis of the procedures applied to produce the frontier, and the assumptions 
made, for example, in relation to the distribution of the inefficiency term. The creation of the “efficient 
frontier” serves the purpose of distinguishing well performing (efficiently operating) production units 
from the group of poor performers. In the literature two major concepts are frequently used in 
generating this frontier: non-parametric and parametric approaches. 
The non-parametric methods first proposed by Farrell (1957) select efficient production units in order 
to create the “efficient production frontier”. The procedure was first applied by Charnes et al. (1978), 
who used linear programming techniques (DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis).
4 Parametric methods 
are considered to be more sophisticated compared to non-parametric techniques, whereby the 
estimation of efficiency is based on economic optimalisation, given the underlying assumption of a 
stochastic optimal frontier. Parametric methods are capable of incorporating both input allocative and 
technical efficiencies. The two most frequently used parametric techniques are the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) and the Distribution Free Approach (DFA). The SFA was independently developed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). It attempts to decompose the residual 
of the frontier into inefficiency and noise by making explicit assumptions about the inefficiency 
component’s distribution. The DFA of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Berger (1993) is based on 
similar logic, though distinguished from the former method by not applying assumptions as to the 
distribution of the inefficiency component. 
Most of the publications covering the theme study the banking system of the USA. Relatively few 
European studies have been published on efficiency, and the analysis of the financial systems of 
                                            
3   This is suggested by the “Quiet life” hypothesis.  
4   DEA is a non-parametric method for calculating relative efficiency scores in a multi input-output production environment. It 
measures the performance of all decision-making units compared to the generated efficient frontier. Best-practice banks, 
which construct the DEA frontier, produce given output combinations with the lowest level of inputs or achieve the highest 
level of output with a given level of inputs, i.e. operate with an optimal input-output combination. Firms which do not operate 
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transition economies from an efficiency point of view has been very limited.
5 Comparative research 
analysing the efficiency of banking systems in different countries is also very scarce, possibly owing to 
the difficulty of managing problems arising from different operational environments and their impact on 
efficiency. 
The table below provides a brief overview of the literature.
6  
Authors Methodology  Result
1 
USA 
Sinan and Register (1989) USA  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1983) average X-inefficiency: 23% 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) USA  Stochastic/parametric; SFA 
Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1984) average X-inefficiency: 26%;  
average technological inefficiency: 21% 
Aly et al. (1990) USA  Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1986) average technological 
inefficiency: 35% 
Kaparakis et al. (1994) USA  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1986) average X-inefficiency: 12% 
Berger (1995) USA  Stochastic/parametric; DFA  (1980-1989) average X-inefficiency: 
39% 
Berger and Mester (1997) USA  Stochastic/parametric; DFA  (1990-1995) average X-inefficiency: 
13%;  
average profit-inefficiency: 9% 
Developed European Countries 
Berg (1992) NO  Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1984-1990) average technological 
inefficiency: 44% 
Lang and Welzel (1996) DE  Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1989-1992) average technological 
inefficiency: 43% 
Bos and Kool (2001) NL  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1992-1998) average X-inefficiency: 
26%; 
average profit-inefficiency: 44% 
Koetter (2004) DE  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1994-2001) average X-inefficiency: 
9-27% 
Among old EU member states 
Allen and Rai (1996) AT, BE, DE, 
DK, FI, FR, GB, IT, SW 
Stochastic/parametric; SFA; 
DFA 
(1988-1992) average X-inefficiency: 
20%  
Bikker (1999) BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, ES, UK  
Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1989-1999) average X-inefficiency: 
53% 




(1993-1997) average X-inefficiency: 
16%;  
average profit-inefficiency: 17% 
                                            
5   As emphasised by Berger and Humphrey (1997), of the 122 efficiency studies, encompassing 21 countries, only roughly 5% 
study transition economies. 
6   In the table, transition economies in Europe comprise a separate category, irrespective of the geographical location of the 
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Authors Methodology  Result
1 
Among old EU member states (cont) 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) AT, 




(1993) average technological 
inefficiency: 34% 
Bikker (2002) AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, 
ES, SE 
Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1990-1997) average X-inefficiency: 
30% 
Weil (2004) AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, GB, GR, IT, LU, PT, ES  
Stochastic/parametric; SFA; 
DFA 
(1994, 2000) average X-inefficiency: 
35% 
Transition Economies 
Tóth (1999) HU  Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1996-1997) average technological 
inefficiency: 40% 
Kasman (2002) TR  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1988-1998) average X-inefficiency: 
25% 
Hasan and Marton (2000) HU  Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1993-1997) average X-inefficiency: 
25%;  
average profit-inefficiency: 30% 
Among Transition Economies 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) 
BU, CZ, CRO, EE, HU, KAZ, LV, 




(1993-2000) average X-inefficiency: 
24%; 36%; 
average profit-inefficiency: 38%; 54% 
Grigorian and Manole (2002) 
ARM, BEL, BU, CRO, CZ, EE, 
HU, KAZ, LV, LT, MO, PL, RO, 
RUS, SI, SK, UKR 
Deterministic/non-parametric; 
DEA 
(1995-1998) average technological 
inefficiency: 47% 
Among Transition and Developed Economies 
Kosak and Zajc (2004) AT, BE, 
CY, CZ, DE, EE, HU, IT, LT, LV, 
MT , NL, PL, SI, SK 
Stochastic/parametric; SFA  (1996-2003) average X-inefficiency: 
16.7% 
Tomova (2005) BU, CRO, CZ, 




(1993-2002) average technological 
inefficiency: 55% 
Notes: USA (United States of America), EU (European Union), ARM (Armenia), AT (Austria), CRO (Croatia), CY (Cyprus), 
CZ (Czech Republic), BE (Belgium), BEL (Byelorussia), BU (Bulgaria), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), EE (Estonia), ES 
(Spain), FI (Finland), FR (France), GB (Great Britain), GR (Greece), HU (Hungary), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), KAZ (Kazakhstan), 
LT (Latvia), LU (Luxemburg), LV (Lithuania), MAC (Macedonia), MO (Moldova), MT (Malta), NL (the Netherlands), NO 
(Norway), PL (Poland), PT (Portugal) RO (Romania), RUS (Russia), SE (Sweden), SI (Slovenia), SK (Slovakia), TR (Turkey), 
UKR (Ukraine).  
1  The inefficiency is measured on a scale from 0 (or 0%) to 1 (or 100%). Best performing bank has inefficiency score of 0 (or 
0%) and efficiency score of 1 (or 100%). 
DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis; SFA: Stochastic Frontier Approach; DFA: Distribution Free Approach. 
 
3. Empirical  analysis 
In the empirical analysis we first compare the operational environment of EU banking systems, then 
define variables used in the econometric model; after this, we describe the main characteristics of the 
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3.1  European Union wide comparison of banking systems’ operational environment  
The enlargement of the EU substantially increased heterogeneity among member countries’ banking 
systems. As a consequence of the common economic convergence path and regulatory harmonisation 
imposed by the “Acquis Communautaire” the integration of the newcomers’ banking systems has 
strengthened over the last decade. However, in terms of macroeconomic and regulatory environment, 
depth of financial intermediation and market structure several differences across EU member 
countries still persist. Since the characteristics of a financial system’s operational environment - often 
shaped independently of the “conscious” behaviour of management - may have an impact on the 
results and conclusions of efficiency measurement, an investigation of the main causes of home bias 
is required. 
3.1.1 Macroeconomic  environment 
The EU member countries have entrenched macroeconomic stability over the last decade. The 
majority of old member states fulfilled nominal convergence, the Maastricht criteria, and introduced the 
common currency, the euro, in 1999. In eight of the ten new member countries the transition from a 
centrally planned to a market-based economic regime and the rapid economic growth accompanying it 
opened the way for real convergence with the EU and nominal convergence with the five pillars of 
euro standards (price and exchange rate stability, fiscal balance, low general government debt, 
convergence of long-term interest rates). However, despite the rapid catching-up process, major 
economic differences remain, particularly between old and new member states. 
Regarding the real economic convergence it should be noted that although in the new member 
countries economic and productivity growth far exceeds that of the old members, the level of 
development still falls behind. The average level of new members’ development measured with GDP 
per capita in PPP terms is approximately two thirds that of old ones. Only the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovenia pass this level. 
Chart 1 
Distance of economic development and inflation 














































































PPP based GDP per capita (left hand scale) Consumer inflation (right hand scale)
% %
 
 Note: EU-15 encompasses old EU members, while EU-10 denotes new EU members.  
 Source: Eurostat. 
With respect to the nominal convergence it should be highlighted that, prior to the introduction of the 
euro, the inflation of old member countries had dropped sharply and reached the level of price stability. 
Furthermore, over the transition period sound macroeconomic and structural policies succeeded in 
lowering inflation in the new member countries as well. Thus, at an aggregated level the gap between 
the average pace of inflation in old and new member states has substantially narrowed. However, the 
inflationary dispersion between member countries remains virtually unchanged in relative terms. 
Regarding the old members the dispersion is mainly caused by existing differences in economic 222  BIS Papers No 28
 
openness and competitiveness. As for the newcomers, the high relative standard deviation of inflation 
is explained by the fact that only six out of the ten countries (i.e. excepting Cyprus, Hungary, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) achieved price stability as imposed by the Maastricht criteria as early as 2003.  
The common monetary policy has decreased the dispersion of interest rates across euro-area 
countries and led to higher price homogeneity. In relation to long-term interest rates, all new EU 
member states have fulfilled the convergence criteria, with the exception of Hungary. In the case of 
short-term interest rates, however, high variability across newcomers can still be observed due to the 
differences in inflation rates as well as risk premiums influenced by fiscal balance and exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
The majority of EU countries comply with the threshold for the budget deficit and public debt ratio. In 
some larger old member states (Germany, France) and in half of the new member countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia), however, a deterioration in the fiscal balance can be 
observed. For the old members the Stability and Growth Pact, and in the case of new members the 
required introduction of the euro, may curb further fiscal divergence. 
3.1.2  Regulatory environment  
After the 1980s the EU financial sector underwent considerable changes due to several waves of 
liberalisation (free flow of capital) and deregulation (establishment, activity and liquidation of credit 
institutions). Following the European Commission’s White Paper (1986), the Second European 
Directive (1989) with the two parallel Directives on Solvency Ratios and Own Funds, the introduction 
of the Single European Licence (1993) and the Financial Service Action Plan (1999), the convergence 
of regulatory systems was considerably accelerated.
7 Since the new EU members already complied 
with the most important European directives, the EU enlargement slowed down but did not suspend 
the continuous harmonisation of financial regulations and the creation of a suitable supervisory 
architecture.
8  
It is essential to highlight that, although accomplishment of the majority of European directives has 
eased heterogeneity in regulation and standards in recent years, some differences still persist. The 
stringency of regulation shows significant dispersion among EU countries, reflecting the variety of 
domestic financial markets, legislations and supervisory practices.
9 In addition, within financial 
regulation but above the directives, i.e. over the level of minimum standards, notable differences can 
be observed as well. Mention can be made here of consumer protection schemes, safeguarding of 
minority shareholders’ interests, corporate governance, stimulation of disclosure, competition and 
efficiency improvement. 
3.1.3  The depth of financial intermediation 
Among the major factors linked to the operational environment, the largest differences among EU 
member states arise in relation to financial intermediation. The average total loans to GDP ratio of new 
members (36%) is less than one third of the rate of old members (125%).  
                                            
7   In the future the largest challenges for the EU are linked to the harmonisation of different regulations concerning mortgage 
lending, fund management, financial advisory services, money laundering and insurance as well as the implementation of 
Basel II and, in the case of new members, the adoption of the euro.  
8    However, several EU countries are yet to fully adopt common guidelines regarding credit cooperations and deposit 
insurance schemes. In addition, some new member states must proceed with harmonisation with European directives on 
regulation-related capital adequacy, operation of branches and subsidiaries, and bankruptcy laws. 
9   Cervalatti (2003) investigates this issue in detail. BIS Papers No 28  223
 
Chart 2  
Banks’ lending to the private sector 














































































Note: Luxembourg was not represented in Chart 2 as in this country the private sector loans to GDP ratio is very high, above 
500%. 
Source: ECB: Report on EU Banking Structure (November 2004). 
In terms of the level and the development of financial intermediation, new members can be divided 
into three well definable groups. The GDP-proportionate level of loans provided by the banking system 
to the private sector in Cyprus and Malta had reached the average rate of old EU member states as 
early as 2001. The rapid growth of the banks’ economic role in these two countries is attributed to the 
early wave of privatisation, accelerated financial liberalisation and the stable growth rate of the 
economy. The second group includes the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the depth of financial 
intermediation approximated the minimum level of old member states (60%) as early as 1998 due to 
intense financing of state-owned enterprises and early capital liberalisation. Nevertheless, private 
sector loans to GDP was roughly halved by 2003 (30%) due to, firstly, considerable portfolio-cleaning 
and tightening regulation, and secondly, the strong knock-out effect of the budgetary sector. In the 
third group can be ranged the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania
10 and Latvia), Poland, Hungary and 
Slovenia, where financial intermediation has constantly gained depth only since 1999. However, 
despite the upward trend, the lag of these countries relative to the old members’ average has not 
diminished measurably. 
The low depth of financial intermediation witnessed in the majority of new EU members is linked to 
numerous common factors. The Central-Eastern European countries and the Baltic States suffered 
from renewed recession and experienced output loss during the transition from socialist to market 
economy, which weakened loan demand and also supply through the increasing level of non-
performing exposure. In the stabilisation phase following the macroeconomic and bank crises, the 
privatisation and recapitalisation of banks and the establishment of an adequate and essential 
regulatory architecture consumed several years. The low depth of financial intermediation may also be 
explained by the fact that the banking sector is competing on the international corporate financing 
market, linked to the predominant role of foreign-owned multinational corporations. Furthermore, 
another feature of banking markets which needs to be addressed is accelerating disintermediation. 
Banks’ intermediation on the liability side is gradually decreasing, owing to the increasing role of non-
bank financial intermediation. Falling bank interest rates and the development of financial culture are 
resulting in growing proliferation of non-bank forms of savings. 
                                            
10   The depth of financial intermediation is the lowest in Lithuania, due - over and above the common factors - to numerous 
bank crises.  224  BIS Papers No 28
 
Finally it should be stressed that a strong discrepancy in the depth of banking intermediation can also 
be observed among the old EU members. The private sector loans to GDP ratio is lower in Finland, 
Greece and France, and higher in the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Portugal and Germany 
compared to the average. The cross-sectional dispersion of financial depth is probably caused by the 
varying role assigned to the capital market in financing, the dissimilar stringency of regulation and 
other country-specific characteristics. 
3.1.4 Market  concentration 
As a result of the consolidation process, the new EU member states have not only succeeded in 
narrowing the gap between themselves and old member states in economic and regulatory areas and 
in financial intermediation, but also in relation to market structure. Even so, considerable differences in 
market concentration still persist across the member states.  
In the new member states, following the creation of a two-tier banking system the privatisation and 
recapitalisation of state-owned banks as well as several new entries fostered the break-up of the initial 
monopolistic market structure. Greater competition and the dominant degree of foreign ownership
11 
encouraged the implementation of best practices (advanced risk management, corporate governance 
techniques and accounting methods) and the transfer of know-how and well educated labour forces 
enhanced productivity gains and integration.
12 In the second half of the 1990s, mergers and 
acquisitions as well as numerous bank liquidations suspended the falling concentration of the banking 
system and stabilised the oligopolistic market structure. 
Chart 3  





























































 Note: Concentration is defined as the sum of the five largest banks’ market share in terms of total assets. 
 Source: ECB: Report on EU Banking Structure (November 2004). 
By comparing the sum of the five largest banks’ market share in terms of total assets, only Poland and 
Hungary among the newcomers have market concentration as low as that of the old member states’ 
average owing to the relatively large size of their banking systems.
13 Mainly due to the small market 
                                            
11   Among the new members the degree of foreign involvement can be considered low (36%) only in the Slovenian banking 
sector. Among the rest of the new EU members, 50-99% of the banking sector is in foreign hands.  
12   The effect on efficiency of the connection between parent banks and subsidiaries can be regarded as a very important 
feature. This could be a theme for future research. 
13   In large countries more banks may be able to reach the adequate scale, while in small markets fewer banks may achieve 
the optimal scale of production. BIS Papers No 28  225
 
size and an inherited distorted market structure, the rest of the new EU member countries have 
banking sectors characterised by strong concentration (the sum of the five largest banks’ market share 
spreads between 63% and 100%). 
The market structure of old EU member states is also undergoing transformation. Contrary to trends in 
the group of new EU member countries, the average concentration in old member states is at a 
relatively low level. However, it has constantly edged higher in recent years, in parallel with an 
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions aimed at boosting market power and/or improving 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the concentration of the old members’ banking sectors remains relatively low, 
while dispersion (concentration ranges from 22% to 84%), which is closely related to the significant 
differences in market size, still exceeds that of the new members. 
3.2  Sample and variables 
When selecting variables the first difficulty is posed by the definition of costs, input prices and outputs, 
i.e. the components of bank production. In the related literature two concepts have been adopted: the 
“intermediation approach” and the “production approach”. The intermediation approach considers 
banks’ deposits as inputs in the production process. Contrary to the above, the production approach 
claims that deposits and various bank liabilities are also outputs.
14 In our study following Sealey and 
Lindley (1977), we employ the intermediation approach. We suppose a multi-output production model. 
In our model, the firms produce three outputs with three inputs. The outputs are defined as loans,
15 
other earning assets and non interest revenues, while the inputs are defined as labour, physical 
capital and borrowed funds. As data on the number of employees are not available, labour cost for 
every bank is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets.
16 The price of physical 
capital is approximated by the ratio of the difference of non-interest and personnel expenses to fixed 
assets. The price of borrowed funds of a certain bank is equal to the average of the cost of funds paid 
by the remaining banks in the same country. Cost of funds corresponds to the ratio of interest 
expenses to interest-bearing liabilities.
17 The total cost is defined as the sum of interest paid, non-
interest expenses, and personnel expenses for every bank. We use pre-tax profit for the estimation of 
the profit frontier.  
In addition to the selection of output and input variables, the other major challenge is linked to the 
selection of the auxiliary variable serving to reduce the heterogeneity arising between countries and 
banks. The application of a Fourier-flexible functional form can moderate the heterogeneity related to 
size.
18 For the purpose of further reducing the distorting effect of varying size and other operational 
bias (macro and regulatory environment, market structure), the use of environmental variables, such 
as inflation, depth of financial intermediation, market concentration, level of liberalisation and banking 
reform is also warranted.
19 The first equation (uncontrolled model) only contains the input and output 
                                            
14   A lesser known, but interesting aspect of the literature is the user cost approach. It is based on the following premise: the 
net income generating capability of a monetary instrument determines whether it is an input or an output in the production 
process. According to Hancock (1991) if the financial returns on an asset exceed the opportunity cost of funds, the given 
instrument is deemed to be a financial output; otherwise, it corresponds to input. The problem with this approach is that 
interest rates and user costs fluctuate over time. It is possible that an item which is deemed to be an input in a given period 
may correspond to output in another period. 
15   The database does not enable us to separate loans into categories. 
16   We assume that unit labour cost is exogenous to the banks’ behaviour. The ratio of personnel expenses and the number of 
employees does not take the productivity of the labour force into account. 
17    We attempt to measure exogenous deposit prices. Koetter (2004) finds that average cost-efficiency is sensitive to 
endogenous or exogenous specifications for input prices. 
18   It is not unambiguous that in all cases the size differences bias the measurement of efficiency. A large bank compared to a 
small or medium sized firm might be more scale-efficient, and may attract higher qualified management. At the same time, 
managing a larger firm is a more complex task. The counter-effects may “extinguish” each other.  
19   Due to the strong correlation (0.8) between levels of development and depth of financial intermediation PPP based GDP per 
capita was not used in cost and profit function as a control variable. 226  BIS Papers No 28
 
variables and trigonometric terms, while the second alternative equation (controlled model) is 
expanded with selected country-specific variables.
20,21  
3.3 Data  description 
Data are taken from Bankscope 22 and cover 2459 banks from the 25 member states of the EU. Our 
sample includes commercial, cooperative and saving banks. We attempted to establish our database 
from unconsolidated data; if this was not possible we collected consolidated data. Banks whose 
dependent or independent variables were not available were removed from the sample. The period of 
observations extends from 1999 up to 2003 on account of data quality. The descriptive statistics, 
attached as an annex, clearly indicate that, according to the number of banks and asset size, the 
coverage of banking systems in the new and old member states is different. In the old member states 
large banks are overrepresented and small banks are underrepresented. Our sample contains 20-50% 
of operating banks in the old EU member states; nevertheless, the coverage of the banking system 
according to total assets is between 70% and 90%. Sweden and England comprise an exception, 
enabling coverage of only 40-50% due to insufficient data. Conclusions drawn in relation to these 
countries should be interpreted with caution. With regard to the new EU member states, the banking 
systems are well represented with respect to both bank number and balance sheet total. 
3.4 Estimation  results 
The SFA is applied. We compute relative efficiency scores
23 from the “controlled” and “uncontrolled” 
models
24 for every year under investigation, assuming exponential distribution of X- and alternative 
profit-inefficiency components. 
3.4.1 Efficiency  scores 
We first estimate X-efficiency scores of the individual banks generated by the “uncontrolled” model, 
then compose the average efficiency for the various member states as well as for the old and new 
member countries and for the whole EU. 
Table 1 presents results which indicate that over the investigated period the banking systems of the 
EU witnessed an average, moderate rise in X-efficiency. Our result confirms the existence of an 
efficiency gap between the two regions in favour of old members.
25 In the old EU member states, a 
stagnation in efficiency on a high level can be experienced, while in the new member states there has 
been a rapid catching-up process from a relatively low level. In the period examined, the efficiency gap 
between the two regions experienced a sharp fall from 23 percentage points in 1999 to 15 percentage 
points in 2003. The mean efficiency of the whole EU and of the old and new member states amounted 
to 85%, 86% and 67% respectively. 
                                            
20   In the basic equation the number of input and output variables and cross products is 20, the number of trigonometric terms 
is 18. In the expanded equation a further 5 parameters are estimated (parameters of inflation, depth of financial 
intermediation, market concentration, level of liberalisation and banking reform).  
21   If independently of the operational environment the banks’ main aim is to reach the lowest cost and highest profit function as 
soon as possible, then in the case of using proper control variables the efficiency scores measure only managerial ability. 
However, if banks have other strategic aims, such as a short-term profit target, we can only partially capture exogenous 
effects as we cannot control for the extent of pressure on efficiency improvement explained by operational environment. 
Overall, in the latter case we can only capture the direct and miss the indirect effects of operational environment on 
efficiency.   
22   Bureu van Dijk (2004). 
23   Efficiency scores are between 0 (or 0%) and 1 (or 100%). Bank without inefficiency term has efficiency score of 1 (or 100%).  
24   We used the Maximum Likelihood method to solve the parameters.  
25   Earlier Kosak and Zajc (2004) supported the existence of an efficiency gap between the group of selected Western and 
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Table 1 also lists the results obtained from an alternative model, in which some “exogenous effects” 
that can influence costs were controlled. The mean efficiency scores of the enlarged EU and old 
member states exhibit stability over time. It is noteworthy, however, that in 1999, the old and 
particularly the new members “started” from a higher efficiency level in comparison to the previous 
model. The efficiency gap between the old and new member states fell from 10 percentage points in 
1999 to 7 percentage points in 2003, in contrast to the previous model. In the investigated period the 
mean efficiency scores amounted to 89% in the EU as a whole, 90% in the old member states and 
82% in the new EU countries. The banking system of the EU has still room for improvement, as it 
could produce the same level of output with, ceteris paribus, 12.4% lower costs or, equivalently, with 
the same level of cost it could produce more output. Annual cost surplus for the entire EU corresponds 
to 0.7% of aggregate GDP. This measure can be also interpreted as welfare loss. 
Table 1 
Average X-efficiency scores among EU regions and the EU 
1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
EU-25 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.85
EU-15 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86
EU-10 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.67
Efficiency gap 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.19
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
EU-25 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89
EU-15 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90
EU-10 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.82





The conclusions drawn from the controlled and uncontrolled model reveal consistency in the sense 
that narrowing of the X-efficiency gap is observed in both cases. Nevertheless, the size of efficiency 
gap is smaller in the controlled than in the uncontrolled case.  
The models of the estimated alternative profit function fully correspond to the cost functions estimated 
in relation to X-efficiency, with the difference that in this case the dependent variable of our models is 
pre-tax profit. 
Table 2 shows that the average profit-efficiency scores of old and new member country groups seem 
to be very close to each other. Therefore, the efficiency gap is consequently very small in a five year 
average. An interesting result was produced with regard to the uncontrolled model; the efficiency 
advantage of old member states was not evident in the period of 1999-2001. New member states 
appeared slightly more profit-efficient in all years. The profit-efficiency of the EU and sub-regions 
averaged at around 69-70% in the investigated period. 
It is interesting to note that, in the controlled case as with the estimation of X-efficiency, a profit-
efficiency gap in favour of the old member states emerges. Eliminating the home bias is likely to 
account for the difference between controlled and uncontrolled models. This efficiency gap between 
the two groups of countries slightly dropped in the period under review and averaged 4 percentage 
points. The average efficiency level of the EU as a whole amounted to 71% as old and new members 
totalled at 72% and 68% respectively. The mean score of the enlarged EU indicates an annual 40.8% 
loss in profit efficiency, which is equivalent to 0.5% of GDP. 
Comparing the empirical findings of X- and alternative profit-efficiency estimation, it can be stated that 
the value of rank-order correlation of 0.7 calculated on the results of the controlled model is 228  BIS Papers No 28
 
considered relatively strong. This means that, taking into account only managerial ability, the majority 
of X-efficient countries are also more profit-efficient and vice versa.
26 In the uncontrolled case, 
however, the counter-effects of domestic characteristics weakened rank-order correlation to -0.1. 
Table 2 
Average profit-efficiency scores among EU regions and the EU 
1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
EU-25 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.69
EU-15 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69
EU-10 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.70
Efficiency gap -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
EU-25 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.71
EU-15 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.72
EU-10 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.68





Charts 4 and 5 give a graphical illustration of the relation between cost- and profit-efficiency. Scatter 
plots demonstrate the distances in X- and alternative profit-efficiency scores from the “benchmark”  27 
states. The countries are sorted into the four quarters of the Cartesian plane. In the upper right part, 
X- and profit-efficient countries are classified. In the lower left quarter are those states that prove to be 
inefficient according to both indicators. The other two sections include only X- or only profit-efficient 
countries. Scatter plots provide evidence in support of our claim that distortion effects are of high 
importance. The standard deviation of efficiency scores is much lower in the controlled (Chart 5) than 
in the uncontrolled (Chart 4) case. 
In general, countries located in the upper right part are characterised by a sustainable financial 
position and strong income generating capacity. By contrast, the upper and lower left as well as the 
lower right parts represent unsustainable states from the perspective of banks’ long- term operation. 
X-inefficient but profit-efficient banking systems, which can be found in the upper left part of the scatter 
plot, may face two alternatives. By gaining a competitive edge on the X-efficiency and therefore the 
profit-efficiency side, banks can move to the right. If firms do not implement efficiency improvements, 
however, banking sectors shift into the lower left quarter as the continuous homogenisation of markets 
leads to the deterioration of profit-efficiency. With respect to countries lacking X-efficiency and 
alternative profit-efficiency, a major restructuring of the banking sector is expected in the long term.
28 
                                            
26   If we had perfectly controlled for market distortions the rank-order correlation of X- and alternative profit-efficiencies would 
have approached 1. 
27   The construction of the scatter plots in Charts 4 and 5 is the following: we ranked countries in relation to both X-efficiency 
and alternative profit-efficiency. The “benchmark” country is the one in the middle (13). Those countries’ banking systems 
that were above this level were considered as efficient, otherwise inefficient. We subtracted the efficiency scores from this 
“benchmark” value and multiplied them with minus 1. The benchmark countries in the uncontrolled case were: Sweden and 
Italy; in the controlled case they were: Hungary and Luxemburg.  
28   In the new member countries this may be of no relevance because of the presence of subsidiaries.  BIS Papers No 28  229
 
Chart 4  
Cross-country comparison of X- and alternative 













Note: On the horizontal/vertical axis, distances of X-/profit-efficiency from the “benchmark” are 
portrayed. 
X-efficiency improvement allows banks to leave the lower left part of the scatter plot. More X-efficient 
firms are able to charge lower loan and higher deposit rates and thus produce more output as a 
function of demand and supply elasticity. Since X-efficiency improvement is accompanied by a profit-
efficiency gain, banks can jump directly into the upper right from the lower left quarter. Equally 
X-efficient but, due to market heterogeneity, less profit-efficient banks can be found in the lower right 
part of the Cartesian plane. 
In the long run, the effects of market distortions can be reduced or made to disappear, favouring the 
evaluation of perfect competition. Since, in a perfectly competitive case, firms are operating on the 
same X- and profit-efficiency level, relative efficiency scores are no longer of any relevance. 
Analysing Charts 4 and 5, we primarily focus on the new EU members. Chart 4 demonstrates that the 
majority of new member states are located to the left of the y axis. This means that these countries 
produce poor efficiency in relation to both indicators, or “just” X-efficiency. Banking systems operate 
X-inefficiently but profit-efficiently in the Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Managerial inefficiencies in terms of cost and profit are found in Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania. 
A substantial restructuring can be seen in Chart 5; the results derive from models controlled in relation 
to the effects of distorting factors. Several countries which were previously located in the upper left 
quarter shift to the lower left section. This implies that should no measures be taken to improve 
X-efficiency in the majority of new member states, they may lose their apparent competitive edge on 
profit-efficiency as a result of the expected long-term elimination of the distorting factors, i.e. with the 
strengthening of Common European Banking Market. 230  BIS Papers No 28
 
Chart 5 
Cross-country comparison of X- and alternative 













Note: On the horizontal/vertical axis, distances of X-/profit-efficiency from the “benchmark” are 
portrayed. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, under a common best-practice frontier we estimated and ranked X- and alternative profit-
efficiency scores for banking systems of the 25 EU member states between 1999 and 2003. We 
focused on investigating the efficiency gap between old and new member states, and analysing the 
related trends. In the course of producing X-efficiency and alternative profit-efficiency scores we   
applied Fourier-flexible cost function. Inefficiency components were modelled by the stochastic frontier 
approach. 
Our results led us to the conclusion that controls for distorting factors (macroeconomic environment, 
depth of financial intermediation, market structure, regulatory regime and other country-specific 
factors) originating from the operational environment or the absence of such controls may modify 
results. When evaluating banks, we accordingly assign importance to the distinction and assessment 
of impacts on performance deriving from managerial ability and external environment. 
Independently of the consideration of home bias our empirical findings provide evidence about the 
existence of an X-efficiency gap, as well as suggesting that the competitive edge of old EU members 
in relation to cost-efficiency is decreasing over time. Controls (or lack thereof) for distorting factors - 
particularly for inflation, the level of development, the closely linked depth of financial intermediation 
and the regulatory architecture - reduce (or increase) the size of the actual gap between the old and 
new member states.  
As for estimating alternative profit-efficiency, a gap is also detected between the old and new member 
states between 1999 and 2003, but only if the impact of home market conditions on profitability is 
controlled. If factors originating from the operational environment are controlled, significant differences 
in profit-efficiency between the two regions no longer exist. Our results suggest that, with regard to 
several new member states, concentrated market structure is likely to allow banks to price the cost of BIS Papers No 28  231
 
inefficient operation into interest rates and beyond that to earn oligopolistic rents. In these countries 
non-competitive pricing may have negative welfare consequences, since deadweight loss and a fall in 
consumer surplus may prevent an upturn in savings and investment activity, and thereby the 
achievement of higher economic growth. 
Looking ahead, it should be highlighted that the unbiased X-efficiency gap may produce an adverse 
impact on the long-term competitiveness of financial systems in new EU member states. The 
X-efficiency gap may be narrowed through the higher “internal efficiency reserves” of banks in new EU 
member states compared to old ones, i.e. from a lower efficiency level, banks in new member 
countries have larger room for improvement. There is the risk, however, that the absence of 
competitive pressures may result in a lesser effort on the part of managers to minimise costs. Cost 
minimising pressure may be further weakened by the fact that banks of less developed countries also 
have high “external efficiency reserves”, for the gradual development and integration of the economy 
through the deepening of financial intermediation results in a “natural” efficiency gain. It is also a 
discouraging factor that the “conscious” improvement of efficiency involves higher expenditures in the 
short term and produces the desired impact only in the long term. Advantages and disadvantages 
associated with specific market characteristics in old and new member states are expected to ease as 
a result of the further integration of financial markets and the financial institutional systems within the 
EU. Consequently, managerial ability will gain even higher relevance in determining efficiency. 
Information regarding the bank efficiency in the EU is of high relevance, as it enables policy-makers to 
understand deficiencies of banking operation and prioritise areas for action. Our findings stress the 
prime importance of policy response to enhance the efficient operation of banking systems and 
thereby achieve welfare gains. In the lack of pressure on efficiency improvement the cost of financial 
intermediation can remain relatively high particularly in the new member states which can be a drag on 
the evaluation of an flexible and resilient economy. 232  BIS Papers No 28
 
Appendix 1: 
Fourier-flexible functional form 
Our estimate of the Fourier-flexible cost and alternative profit function is as follows:
29 
(1) 
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where TC corresponds to total cost, π is the pre-tax profit , ym is the m
th output (m=1, 2, 3), wn is the n
th 
input price (n=1, 2, 3), w3 is the price of financial input, ε is the residual (p, r equal to 1, 2, 3 based on 
the number of outputs and inputs). ε =v±u, where ε is the residual, v is the two-sided random noise 
and u is the non-negative inefficiency component. Indices applied to banks have been omitted for the 
purpose of simplification. Symmetry and linear homogeneity require the following parameter 
restrictions: 
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For the application of the Fourier-flexible form the scaling of data is also necessary. Normalisation of 
bank outputs shows the following formula:  
(3) 












π + π =  
                                            
29  The alternative profit function is unique in the sense that its explanatory variables correspond to its cost function; its 
dependent variable, however, corresponds to profit. Since profit may not be a negative value, it may cause problems in 
relation to logarithmisation. The problem may be remedied by adding a constant to each profit value, which is at least as 
























  Appendix 2: 
Descriptive statistics 
Number Total assets
of banks Aver. (M.) Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev Aver. Rel. stdev Aver. Rel. stdev Aver. Rel. stdev Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev Aver. (M.) Rel. stdev
AT 111 460146.1 4145.5 0.3 1993.5 0.3 1843.9 0.3 0.009 0.13 1.338 0.2 0.071 0.3 222.1 0.2 17.0 0.5 128.4 0.9
BE 44 845732.8 19221.2 0.2 7780.4 0.2 10184.1 0.2 0.008 0.10 1.070 0.0 0.010 0.3 1034.9 0.2 123.6 0.3 574.6 0.0
CY 16 27569.2 1819.9 0.4 934.2 0.3 807.3 0.5 0.014 0.08 0.854 0.2 0.112 0.3 128.6 0.3 24.2 1.2 61.9 0.6
CZ 22 59893.1 2807.4 0.3 1033.5 0.4 1465.6 0.4 0.012 0.09 1.417 0.6 0.180 0.4 238.3 0.5 -1.9 -4.0 104.9 0.0
DE 1080 3267259.2 3025.2 0.2 1492.7 0.2 1420.9 0.3 0.007 0.07 2.810 0.2 0.072 0.2 180.0 0.2 10.4 1.1 45.4 1.1
DK 67 222817.6 3325.6 0.3 1484.4 0.3 1528.7 0.4 0.008 0.10 2.100 0.1 0.064 0.3 156.5 0.2 32.5 0.4 103.0 0.2
EE 6 3608.5 605.2 0.4 354.0 0.5 208.2 0.5 0.010 0.11 1.650 0.2 0.133 0.4 42.1 0.3 13.7 1.0 17.0 0.2
ES 108 1183427.9 10962.2 0.2 5967.2 0.3 3725.9 0.2 0.013 0.09 1.155 0.2 0.101 0.3 611.6 0.2 115.9 0.3 327.3 0.3
FI 6 200244.6 33374.1 0.3 20333.7 0.4 9428.7 0.3 0.008 0.35 1.230 0.8 0.112 0.3 1537.6 0.3 355.6 0.3 1339.0 0.0
FR 208 3045919.6 14643.8 0.2 5094.0 0.2 8238.1 0.3 0.007 0.07 1.500 0.1 0.041 0.2 960.5 0.2 68.8 0.6 263.6 0.9
GB 50 1975420.2 39508.4 0.3 20213.8 0.4 14869.5 0.4 0.011 0.09 0.936 0.1 0.039 0.3 2097.0 0.3 451.3 0.4 790.2 0.0
GR 16 93594.5 5925.8 0.4 2916.2 0.5 2622.2 0.3 0.015 0.07 0.781 0.1 0.113 0.5 404.0 0.3 90.5 0.7 232.0 0.0
HU 23 29129.8 1268.9 0.3 633.1 0.5 531.4 0.2 0.014 0.09 2.300 0.2 0.135 0.3 131.2 0.3 20.5 0.6 56.6 0.1
IE 21 318523.5 19712.0 0.2 8969.8 0.4 7799.0 0.3 0.010 0.28 0.605 1.0 0.080 0.3 916.8 0.3 137.5 0.5 601.7 0.0
IT 459 1520534.9 3312.7 0.2 1788.9 0.3 1171.4 0.3 0.013 0.02 1.226 0.1 0.059 0.2 206.3 0.2 26.7 0.6 49.7 0.8
LT 9 3312.1 368.0 0.5 169.1 0.6 122.0 0.5 0.019 0.22 0.608 0.3 0.150 0.5 27.8 0.3 2.7 1.7 19.7 0.3
LU 70 423150.7 6045.0 0.2 1384.6 0.3 4453.3 0.2 0.003 0.02 0.897 0.1 0.053 0.2 438.4 0.3 40.6 0.5 118.9 0.0
LV 20 4477.9 224.9 0.5 101.1 0.7 97.8 0.6 0.013 0.23 1.105 0.2 0.135 0.5 16.5 0.4 2.4 2.2 10.0 0.8
MT 6 8069.2 1360.4 0.2 632.7 0.2 671.2 0.2 0.010 0.04 0.790 0.4 0.167 0.2 72.8 0.2 12.6 0.4 48.3 0.5
NL 25 1083013.6 43320.5 0.2 26178.7 0.2 7366.4 0.3 0.012 0.03 1.136 0.2 0.077 0.3 2642.9 0.2 292.1 0.3 1083.0 0.9
PL 34 87862.2 2608.9 0.3 1189.5 0.3 1107.2 0.3 0.019 0.06 0.962 0.1 0.110 0.5 288.4 0.4 33.9 0.8 71.5 0.0
PT 15 156724.6 10448.3 0.3 5908.3 0.4 3002.7 0.2 0.007 0.07 4.138 0.2 0.053 0.2 1077.1 0.3 100.5 0.4 343.4 0.0
SE 12 242021.9 20185.7 0.2 8182.8 0.2 7880.7 0.2 0.007 0.11 2.400 0.3 0.073 0.4 1358.8 0.1 129.8 0.5 403.4 0.1
SI 16 15642.5 982.5 0.3 485.3 0.4 291.5 0.3 0.017 0.18 2.600 0.2 0.139 0.2 83.0 0.3 13.7 0.6 37.1 0.1
SK 15 16960.1 1130.7 0.2 456.7 0.4 582.3 0.4 0.013 0.04 1.500 0.6 0.157 0.5 111.4 0.3 8.9 3.4 42.2 0.0
EU-25 2459 2142075.8 6261.5 0.2 2937.4 0.2 2725.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.2 0.07 0.2 377.8 0.2 42.6 0.8 132.9 0.8
EU-15 2292 2295486.1 6603.8 0.2 3100.4 0.2 2872.9 0.3 0.009 0.1 2.0 0.2 0.07 0.2 394.7 0.2 44.5 0.8 138.6 0.8
EU-10 167 36587.9 1563.2 0.4 699.2 0.4 699.1 0.4 0.015 0.1 1.4 0.3 0.14 0.4 146.1 0.3 15.3 0.6 54.1 0.2
Non interest revenues Total assets Loans Other earning assets Total costs Pre-tax profit Wage costs Price of fixed capital Price of int.-b. liabilities
 
Notes: Category denoted by bold shows the period average of the sum of the banks’ total assets in a given country between 1999 and 2003. Categories denoted by italic show the period average of 
the cross-sectional average in a given country between 1999 and 2003. Numbers are in EUR, M. is million. Aver. is abbreviation of simple mean and Rel. stdev is abbreviation of standard deviation.  
234  BIS Papers No 28
 
References 
Aigner D., Lovell C. and Schmidt P., 1977, “Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic frontier 
Production Function Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 6, pp. 21-37. 
Allen L. and Rai A., 1996, “Operational Efficiency in Banking: An International Comparison”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, Issue 4., pp. 655-72. 
Aly H. Y., Grabowski R., Pasurka C. and Ragan N., 1990, “Technical, Scale, and Allocative 
Efficiencies in U.S. Banking: An Empirical Investigation”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, 
pp. 211-18. 
Berg S. A., 1992, “Mergers, Efficiency and Productivity Growth in Banking: The Norwegian Experience 
1984-1990”, Norges Bank, Working paper 92/06. 
Berger A.N., 1993, “Distribution-free estimates of efficiency in the U.S. banking industry and tests of 
the standard distributional assumptions”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 261-92. 
Berger A. N., 1995, “The Profit-Structure Relationship in Banking-Tests of Market-Power and Efficient-
Structure Hypotheses”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 404-31.  
Berger A. N. and Hannan T. H., 1993, “Using Efficiency Measures to Distinguish Among Alternative 
Explanations of the Structure-Performance Relationship in Banking”, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No. 18. 
Berger A. N. and Hannan T. H., 1998, “The Efficiency Cost Of Market Power In The Banking Industry: 
A Test Of The “Quiet Life” And Related Hypotheses”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 80, Issue 3, pp. 454-65.  
Berger A. N. and Humphrey D. B., 1997, “Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey and 
Directions for Future Research”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, No. 11. 
Berger A. N. and Mester L. J., 1997, “Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the 
Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 21, pp. 895-947. 
Bikker J. A., 1999, “Efficiency in the European Banking Industry: An Exploratory Analysis to Rank 
Countries”, Research Series Supervision No. 18, De Nederlandsche Bank. 
Bikker J. A., 2002, “Efficiency and Cost Differences across Countries in a Unified European Banking 
Market”, De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB Staff Reports, No. 87. 
Bos J.W.B. and Kool C.J.M., 2001, “Bank Size, Specialization and Efficiency in the Netherlands: 1992-
1998”, Maastricht University, Research Memoranda, No. 8. 
Bureu van Dijk, 2004, Bankscope Database. 
Cervalatti A. M., 2003, “Financial Regulation and Supervision in EU Countries”, University of Bologna.  
Charnes A., Coopere W. W. and Rhodes E. L., 1978, “Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making 
Units”, European Journal of Operations Research, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 429-44. 
Coelli T., 1996, “A Guide to Frontier Version 4.1: A Computer Program for Stochastic Frontier 
Production and Cost Function Estimation”, CEPA Working Paper 96/07. 
Dietsch M. and Weill L., 2000, “The Evolution of Cost and Profit Efficiency in European Banking”, in 
Research in Banking and Finance (Eds: I. Hasan and W. Hunter), Vol. 1, Elsevier. 
Farrell M. J., 1957, “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Vol. 120, pp. 253-81. 
Ferrier G. and Lovell C.A.K., 1990, “Measuring Cost Efficiency in Banking: Econometric and Linear 
Programming Evidence”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 46, pp. 229-45 
Gallant A. R., 1981, “On the Bias in Flexible Functional Forms and an Essentially Unbiased Form: The 
Fourier Flexible Form”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 15, pp. 211-45. 
Grigorian D. A. and Manole V., 2002, “Determinants of Commercial Bank Performance in Transition: 
An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis”, IMF Working Paper No. 146.  
BIS Papers No 28  235
 
Hasan I. and Marton K., 2000, “Development and Efficiency of the Banking Sector in a Transitional 
Economy: Hungarian Experience”, BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 7. 
Kaparakis E., Miller S. and Noulas A., 1994, “Short-Run Cost Inefficiency of Commercial Banks: A 
Flexible Stochastic Frontier Approach”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 26, pp. 875-93. 
Kasman A., 2002, “Cost Efficiency, Scale Economies, and Technological Progress in Turkish 
Banking”, Central Bank Review, No. 1, pp. 1-20. 
Koetter M., 2004, “The Magnitude of Distortions when Measuring Bank Efficiency with Misspecified 
Input Prices”, Utrecht School of Economics. 
Kosak M. and Zajc P., 2004, “The East-West Efficiency Gap in European Banking”, 25
th SUERF 
Colloquium, Madrid. 
Lang G. and Welzel P., 1996, “Efficiency and Technical Progress in Banking: Empirical Results for a 
Panel of German Banks”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 1003-23. 
Lozano-Vivas A., Pastor J.T. and Hasan I., 2001, “European Bank Performance beyond Country 
Borders: What Really Matters?”, European Finance Review, Vol. 5, Issue: 1-2, pp. 141-65. 
Meeusen W. and van den Broeck J., 1977, “Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production 
Functions with Composed Error”, International Economic Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 435-44. 
Móré Cs. and Nagy M., 2003, “Relationship Between Market Structure and Bank Performance: 
Empirical Evidence for Central and Eastern Europe”, MNB working paper No. 12. 
Schmidt P. and Sickles R. C., 1984, “Production Frontiers and Panel Data”, Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics, Vol. 2, pp. 367-74. 
Sealey Jr. C. W. and Lindley, J. T., 1977, “Inputs, Outputs and Theory of Production and Cost at 
Depository Financial Institutions”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 4, pp. 1251-1266.  
Sinan C. A. and Register C.A., 1989, “Banking Efficiency: Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach”, paper 
presented at the 19th Annual FMA Meetings, Boston.  
Tomova M., 2005, “X-efficiency of European Banking - Inequality and Convergence”, Free University 
of Brussels.  
Tóth Á., 1999, “Kísérlet a hatékonyság empirikus elemzésére”, MNB working paper series, 1999/2, 
(available in Hungarian only). 
Vennet V. R., 2002, “Cost and Profit Efficiency of Financial Conglomerates and Universal Banks in 
Europe”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 254-82. 
Weill L., 2004, “The Evolution of Efficiency in European Banking in the 90’s”, 25
th SUERF Colloquium, 
Madrid. 
Yildirim H. S. and Philippatos G. C., 2002, “Efficiency of Banks: Recent Evidence from the Transition 
Economies of Europe 1993-2000”, University of Tennessee. 